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Abstract—The risk of sensitive information disclosure and 
modification through the use of online services has increased 
considerably and may result in significant damage.  As the 
management and assessment of such risks is a well-known 
discipline for organizations, it is a challenge for users from the 
general public. Users have difficulties in using, understanding 
and reacting to security-related threats. Moreover, users only try 
to protect themselves from risks salient to them.  Motivated by 
the lack of risk assessment solutions and limited impact of 
awareness programs tailored for users of the general public, this 
paper aims to develop a structured approach to help in 
protecting users from threats and vulnerabilities and, thus, 
reducing the overall information security risks. By focusing on 
the user and that different users react differently to the same 
stimuli, the authors developed a user-centric risk assessment and 
response framework that assesses and communicates risk on both 
user and system level in an individualized, timely and continuous 
way. Three risk assessment models were proposed that depend 
on user-centric and behavior-related factors when calculating 
risk. This framework was evaluated using a scenario-based 
simulation of a number of users and results analyzed. The 
analysis demonstrated the effectiveness and feasibility of the 
proposed approach. Encouragingly, this analysis provided an 
indication that risk can be assessed differently for the same 
behavior based upon a number of user-centric and behavioral-
related factors resulting in an individualized granular risk 
score/level. This granular risk assessment, provided a more 
insightful evaluation of both risk and response. The analysis of 
results was also useful in demonstrating how risk is not the same 
for all users and how the proposed model is effective in adapting 
to differences between users offering a novel approach to 
assessing information security risks. 
Keywords—Risk; analysis; security behavior; BFI; correlation 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Given the rapid growth of technology and the wide range 
of 24/7 e-services provided by different devices such as 
laptops, mobile phones and wearable technology, the number 
of users is growing every day. With more than 3.8 billion 
Internet users in 2017 compared to 2.9 billion in 2014 [1] and 
one or more Internet-connected devices used in most homes 
[2], users massively use Information Technology (IT) systems 
to carry out their everyday activities. With this increased 
popularity of the Internet and its services, comes an increase 
in information security threats such as malware, social 
engineering and hacking that some users are arguably not 
aware of [3]. Despite the common use of various security 
methods such as intrusion detection systems and antivirus 
software to protect IT systems from different attacks, the 
security threat landscape is rapidly evolving and attackers are 
increasing their efforts in developing sophisticated and 
advanced malware and hacking methods. This is evident as the 
number of created malware grew from 274 million in 2014 to 
almost 670 million with a rate of 1.8 million threats 
introduced everyday in 2017 [4] and an email malware rate of 
1 in 131in 2016  compared to 1 in 244 and 1 in 220 in 2014 
and 2015 respectively [5]. Attackers have a higher chance of 
infecting a user‘s computing device with malware if it has at 
least one popular installed application that is vulnerable and 
out-of-date [6]. 
Managing and assessing information security risks in 
organizations is a well understood and accepted approach used 
widely by enterprise organizations to provide a safe 
environment to carry out their business using  the most cost-
efficient and effective means [7][8]. Many Information 
Security Risk Management (ISRM) methodologies were 
issued by National and International organizations such as The 
National Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST) 
Special Publication 800-series [9] and The International 
Standards Organization ISO/IEC 27000 [10] or as research 
projects [11]. Unfortunately, these traditional risk assessment 
methodologies and tools are designed for organizations and 
not members of the public. Considering the increased number 
of Internet users, the variety of used devices where each 
device has its own security requirements and the continuously 
evolving threat landscape, the need for assessing information 
security risks is not limited to organizations only. Actually, 
this need is expanded to a wider population to include users 
from the general public or simply, users. 
Unfortunately, little evidence is found demonstrating that 
users are knowledgeable of information security threats and 
protection, and actually practicing it [12][13][14]. Indeed, it 
has been found that they are less willing to perform money-
related and sensitive data tasks on some of these devices such 
as smartphones due to issues related to security, privacy, trust 
and usability [15][16]. Furthermore, users have difficulties in 
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using, understanding and reacting to security-related threats 
[16][17][18]. Although educating users about information 
security threats is a well-established and accepted approach in 
organizations where resources are, arguably, allocated to 
achieve the organizations‘ goals, it is a challenge in the case of 
users [19]. Almost 90% of reported security incidents resulted 
from exploits against software vulnerabilities whereas human-
error was considered as one of the top threats to information 
security and almost 1.8 million pieces of malware introduced 
every day [4][14][20][21]. Hence, the need for a usable 
security tool that calculates and assesses risk on both system 
and user level in a timely manner is essential. Additionally, 
the limited impact of awareness programs suggests the need 
for a structured approach tailored for users to help in 
protecting them from threats and vulnerabilities and, thus, 
reducing the overall information security risks [22].  By 
focusing on the user, increased security awareness through 
understanding risk is expected to improve security behavior 
and lead to reduced security risks [23]. Therefore, the aim of 
this paper is to develop a comprehensive and continuous 
framework that assesses and communicates information 
security risks for users of the public in both an individualized 
and timely manner. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: 
Section 2 reviews related work on assessing and 
communicating risks to users. Section 3 presents a user-centric 
framework to information security risk assessment and 
response. This proposed framework is evaluated in Section 4 
followed by a discussion in Section 5. Finally, conclusions 
and future work are highlighted in Section 6. 
II. RELATED WORK 
There are a large number of proposed ISRM 
methodologies and guidelines around the world that differ in 
their approach, level of detail, usage complexity and 
applicability to different-sized organizations [24][25]. There 
are various Information security standards by organizations 
such as ISO/IEC 27005:2011[10] and NIST SP 800-30 [9]. 
Additionally, various Risk Assessment (RA) methodologies 
were developed by professional organizations to meet specific 
requirements and therefore incorporate different steps, 
objectives, level of application and structure. Examples of 
such methodologies are CRAMM [26], CORAS [27], 
OCTAVE  [28], Magerit [29] and Mehari [30] that have been 
fully or partially adopted by organizations to identify, analyze 
and treat their information security risks. Furthermore, these 
methodologies have different analysis approaches towards risk 
whether threat-oriented, Asset/Impact oriented or 
Vulnerability-oriented. They are quantitative, qualitative or 
semi-quantitative in nature where there is no exact risk value 
because of the uncertainty and subjectivity in defining 
likelihood and severity of consequences [31]. To reveal major 
risks and to get a general indication of the risk level, a 
quantitative estimation could be used first followed by a 
qualitative analysis. Among those techniques used to calculate 
information system‘s risks is Vulnerability Management that 
is represented by The Security Content Automation Protocol 
SCAP [32][33]. To communicate security information, SCAP 
provides several standard specifications, including Open 
Vulnerability and Assessment Language (OVAL) 
[34]  ,Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure (CVE) [35] and 
Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) [36]. The Common 
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is a scoring system that 
provides a standard specification that measures the severity of 
software vulnerabilities [37] and a widely used cybersecurity 
model [21][32][33][38][39][40]. The National Vulnerability 
Database (NVD) is a valuable source of security knowledge 
and publically available online [41]. Each NVD record 
contains CVE-id, vulnerable software list, vulnerability 
published date and time, CVSS base metrics and scores and so 
on. NVD uses CVSS to measure vulnerabilities severity which 
provides evidence of the wide and accepted adoption of CVSS 
by the security community [42]. Moreover, it is often used as 
a metric for risk [38]. 
There are many proposed RA methodologies in the 
literature that are built on those methodologies where each 
method has its own objectives, steps, structure and level of 
application. Based on the OCTAVE methodology and in the 
context of educational organizations for example , authors of 
[43] proposed risk assessment framework for a university 
computing environment and  [44] performed an ISRM study 
in order to educate management and users of a computer 
information system in secondary schools on how to protect 
their information assets and reduce risks to their information 
systems through risk management. In the former, the risk 
assessment proposed needed skilled individuals that 
understand statistics, probabilities and information 
technology. Whereas in the latter, given the conservative 
environment of schools, the observed behavior of the selected 
sample members maybe inaccurate with the presence of the 
researcher and may not reflect their actual normal behavior. 
Authors of [45] proposed a RA methodology for smartphones 
that has an ISO/IEC 27005:2011 compatible theoretical basis. 
The proposed risk assessment method provides "fined-
grained" valuation. User input for (sub) asset impact is based 
on two-dimensional data taxonomy. This user involvement, 
leads to a ‗personalized‘ risk assessment, where other 
smartphone oriented methods use mainly expert opinion. 
However, user input details vary according to user skill which 
may affect the quality of results. Also, users assessing the 
asset impact of application is complex where the number of 
applications maybe numerous and the user is assumed to know 
the applications significance.  A risk management 
methodology was proposed in [46] based on NIST SP 800-30 
risk management guide. However, the proposed methodology 
does not determine the exact interaction between controls and 
resource dependency nor evaluate the way in which threats 
spread through the system. Authors of [47] used a qualitative 
approach, structured interviews, to identify potential threats 
then a quantitative approach, survival analysis, to analyze the 
risks. A particular strength of this framework is that it 
considers the time dimension in identifying threats that vary 
over time. However, there could be difficulties with applying 
this framework in practice since it has not been tested yet, so 
no indications of its effectiveness and reliability. 
To the author‘s knowledge, despite the increased attention 
on Information Security Risk Assessment (ISRA) in enterprise 
organizations, there is a lack of tools and methods in the 
literature that are tailored for the general public. Nevertheless, 
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some websites do provide information and advice on how to 
protect yourself in the cyber world such as Getsafeonline.org 
and staysafeonline.org. However, they could be used as 
awareness tools that provide advice and guidance to users to 
make informed decisions regarding their security behavior. 
These tools do not provide the expected level of RA that users 
are exposed to. Many of these users are not aware of these 
risks and/or do not have the necessary knowledge to use the 
available websites to analyze these risks and overcome 
security risks problem. A web-based risk analysis tool for 
home users based on the ISO 17799 standard was proposed by 
[48]. The performance of the tool was evaluated with means 
of the interface design described as user-friendly, easy to use 
and accessible. No evaluation regarding the way the tool 
assessed the different security levels and the provided support, 
maybe because it has not been tested by users with a certain 
level of security background.  Authors of [49] proposed a 
Mobile Device Risk Assessment (MDRA) risk assessment 
method based on a 6-step risk calculation scheme. Although 
the proposed approach is clear and easy to use by different 
stakeholders, the whole risk calculation process was 
challenging for novice users. The framework proposed by [23] 
was a continuous and automated risk assessment framework 
for Android mobile applications called RiskMon. The main 
idea of RiskMon is to use machine-learned ranking to assess 
risks. Although, users specifying security requirements for 
security tools is a challenging task, the framework design 
allows for user's expected behavior rather than developers 
practices. However, it is subjective since it relies on user's 
input of relevancy levels for permission groups (user's 
expectations) and their understanding of these permission 
groups for each trusted application. This may result in biased 
choices. Although this risk model provides a continuous and 
automated RA, it is considered as low (machine)-level and 
limited to Android Mobile Apps. Moreover, users rely on a 
diversity of platforms and operating systems which makes it 
challenging as it increases the knowledge burden on users in 
maintain security in these different devices [50]. 
Not limited to assessing information security risks, many 
studies in the literature advice that, aside from the ―one-size-
fits-all‖ approach,  a targeted risk communication approach 
should be adopted where messages contain the required 
technical and non-technical context, engaging and above all 
examined to ensure if they have an impact on users or not 
[3][33][51][52][53][54]. Actually, when these messages are 
not understood by the user, this may result in negative 
consequences that experts blame users for. The authors of [54] 
suggest that to effectively communicate security risks, users 
should be categorized according to their IT knowledge. 
Whereas a user education approach in risk communication that 
improves user‘s self-confidence and stresses on his 
responsibility of his own protection is recommended by 
authors of [19][55][56]. However, [51] argue that due to the 
timing and used terminology, information security threats 
warnings are easily and often ignored. Hence, human security 
behavior is critical to ensure an efficient information security 
environment that does not depend on technology only.  It is 
suggested that risk communication should go one step further 
to changing user‘s security behavior [57][58][59]. However, 
several studies have confirmed that users do not react in the 
same manner to the same security threat nor the same user 
make the same decision in all situations. Moreover, they 
stressed that due to different factors filtered through user‘s 
personality, intended behavior may differ from actual behavior 
[52][60][61][62]. Many studies have highlighted the influence 
of user‘s characteristics such as personality traits [63][64], 
demographics and mother tongue [65][66][67] and IT 
proficiency [68][69] on user‘s security behaviors. In addition 
to these characteristics, [70] identified other factors related to 
the used security software such as risk communication, 
usefulness and delivery methods. Further to that, [70] 
demonstrated the impact of user‘s characteristics from a 
holistic point of view on user‘s risk-taking behavior and why 
some users are at risk more than others. Their findings suggest 
that given a certain user behavior and different users, risk is 
not the same for all of them. This work will be based on their 
findings. These studies demonstrate the importance of a 
targeted user-focused and not fact-focused risk 
communication that transforms the user from being ill-
informed to a security minded user. 
III. USER-CENTRIC INFORMATION SECURITY AND 
RESPONSE (UCRAR) FRAMEWORK 
Many types of data are stored on user‘s devices such as 
photos, contacts, documents and messages that are accessed 
by different applications. The terms software and application 
will be used interchangeably to refer to any piece of software 
installed on user‘s device. However, the unauthorized 
modification or disclosure of this data may result in a number 
of undesirable consequences on the CIA and privacy of such 
data. As each application has different impacts on data, which 
suggests that the risk level is changing within the application. 
Actually, different processes within an application have 
different impacts, thus, generating different risk levels for the 
same application. As a result, no single risk level could be 
assigned to an application. Not limited to that, but the way in 
which the user uses these processes may escalate or de-
escalate these risk levels. For example, in a financial-based 
mobile application there are a range of functionalities and 
services that have different levels of risk associated to them. 
Services where there is no sharing of user‘s data as in reading 
products, services and offers have no impact on data, thus, 
from an application based behavioral perspective, risk is kept 
to a minimum. However, this risk level could escalate when 
combined with other non-app related behaviors such as 
connecting to a public Wi-Fi network or using a non-updated 
version of the application. Another example is the process of 
adding a photo in the Facebook application. On the one hand, 
adding a photo of The London Eye, for example, has a low 
risk level whether the user‘s account is public or private. 
Whereas adding the same photo with location data may have 
an impact on user‘s privacy, thus, escalating the risk level to 
medium in a private account and possibly high in a public 
account. On the other hand, for the same process of adding a 
photo but of the user‘s child, for example, in a private account 
has a medium risk level that escalates to high when the 
account is public. These examples serve to demonstrate that 
the risk level of user‘s behaviors within an application process 
could change when combined with other behaviors within the 
same application. Thus, arguably, assessing the risk level 
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based on user‘s behavior may result in a more realistic and 
accurate assessment. To the best of the researcher‘s 
knowledge, assessing and calculating risk for each user 
behavior of each process within an application and combining 
it with other behaviors simultaneously, and using user-centric 
factors, i.e. user‘s characteristics, such as demographics, 
online activity, personality traits and IT expertise as additional 
risk factors to create a user-centric risk profile has not been 
investigated yet. Moreover, combining this user-centric risk 
assessment with system-level risk assessment and smoothing 
it with community-based risk data to create an individualized 
risk profile is a novel approach to security risk assessment. 
Therefore, the necessity for a timely user-centric risk 
assessment and communication approach that adapts to user‘s 
characteristics and can be used across services and 
technologies becomes more apparent. 
The proposed User-centric Risk Assessment and Response 
(UCRAR) framework is composed of two main components 
as in Fig.1. Namely, the Risk Assessment component and the 
Risk Communication component. As part of the novelty of 
this proposed framework, user-centric factors are utilized, 
among other factors, in both components. To accomplish this, 
the following processes are established: 
A. Risk Assessment Component 
In this component, user‘s behaviors are monitored, 
security risks are assessed on both system and user level and 
an individualized risk profile is created accordingly. The 
functionality of this component is accomplished by the 
following processes: 
1) Good (expected) behavior: Among the requirements to 
assess each behavior independently is a clear description of a 
good user behavior. Thus, this knowledge base will include a 
set of descriptors that suggest what a good behavior should be 
in a certain aspect and used as a reference for user security 
compliance. In password hygiene, for instance, a list of good 
behaviors related to password‘s behaviors will be provided 
such as the same password is not used for multiple accounts, 
frequency of changing passwords and not allowing web 
browsers/software/apps to store passwords. 
2) Software detector: There are millions of software 
products in the world. For example, the number of 
applications in Google Play store increased from 400,000 in 
2011 to 3.5 million in 2017 with an average of almost 6000 
applications released on a daily basis [2]. However this fails to 
consider the existence of organizational applications. Many 
applications could be installed on the user‘s device. To 
individually risk assess each installed application would be a 
time consuming task. Thus, the aim of this process is to detect 
all installed software on user‘s device and assign a 
quantitative score to each detected software/app. This score 
could be determined in many ways such as level of 
application/service usage, how important the software is to the 
user or in terms of its CIA impact. To support the user and 
reduce the burden on him in individually scoring each 
installed application, especially if the number of installed 
applications is numerous, that may result in him 
dumping/rejecting the Risk Assessment tool, the 
categorization approach proposed by [49] is adopted. In this 
approach, applications are classified into groups according to 
their type/usage. Then, each group is assigned a certain score. 
This score assignment will be part of system 
startup/configuration where each group will be assigned a 
quantitative value by the user according to its importance from 
his perspective. A scale of 0-very low to 4-very high will be 
used. Then, each detected installed application will be mapped 
into its corresponding group and assigned a score accordingly 
resulting in an app-score. For example, applications are 
classified but not limited to as in Table 1. As a vulnerable/out-
of-date application and those originating from an illegitimate 
source are possible sources of risk, application version, app-
ver, and the name of the source/market from which the 
application was installed from, install-name, are detected. 
Thus, the output of this process is the following tuple: 
Sw-info = (sw-id, app-score, install-name)  
where: sw-id is the software/app ID in Common Product 
Enumeration CPE. 
3) User behavior monitor: With this continuously 
evolving threat landscape and the wide range of computing 
platforms and services accessed, the need to continuously 
monitor and assess user‘s behaviors in a timely manner 
becomes more apparent. Certain users‘ characteristics, i.e 
user-centric factors, were related to changing/influencing his 
risk level, as discussed in Section 2, suggesting that user‘s-
centric factors need to be gathered. Hence, the functionality of 
this process is a two-fold: 
 To continuously monitor user‘s behavior independently 
of the used software and compare it against 
good/expected behavior. This is done in near real-time 
and is event triggered. For example, if a user is to close 
a browser/app, he will be reminded to sign off from 
online service before closing. 
 To collect user info in terms of the specified user‘s 
characteristics, i.e. user-centric factors. This data 
collection is done in three ways, namely, explicitly, 
implicitly and by taking a specialized test as in Table 2. 
For IT proficiency and service usage level user-centric 
factors, the worst-case scenario is adopted. Thus, the 
categories whom found to be in highest risk as of [70] 
are assumed as default values, i.e. non-IT professional 
and high service usage. As the user is using the system, 
his behavior is monitored and these categories will be 
adjusted according to a predefined set of metrics. 
Thus, the output of this process is the following tuple: 
B-info = (B-expected, B-actual, U-info),  
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Fig. 1. The User-centric Risk Assessment and Response, UCRAR, Framework. 
TABLE I. AN EXAMPLE OF SOFTWARE GROUPS 
Social networking e-banking 
Messaging 
Maps and 
navigation 
News Shopping 
e-mail Web access 
Entertainment (games, music …etc) Photography 
Office applications (Ms Word, Ms Excel …etc) Security 
Operating system  
where B-expected is the expected good behavior derived 
from the Good Behavior knowledge base, B-actual is user‘s 
current behavior and U-info is user-centric factors expressed 
as the tuple   (Age, Gender, Personality, Learning-style, IT-
level, Use-level) 
Nevertheless, due to this continuous monitoring, a very 
important aspect is that users need to trust this system and that 
it will not violate their privacy. They need to be aware that 
this monitoring is done for their own protection and any 
collected data will not be used for purposes other than those 
intended for risk assessment and will not be shared with any 
other application. This could be done by having the user, when 
installed the application, accept an agreement terms. 
4) Community-based risk data: The proposed UCRAR is 
based upon user‘s behaviors in a certain point of time.  Once 
the proposed system is running with many people using it, 
there is the chance to look at their user-centric factors, 
behaviors and responses in real time on a continuous basis. 
Information about users, behaviors and responses are fed into 
this Community-Based Risk Data in an anonymized form on a 
continuous basis. Hence, those found statistically significant 
correlations according to [70] could be re-evaluated and the 
user-centric risk estimation will be modified accordingly. For 
example, if the user-centric factor of age no longer has a 
statistically significant correlation with a certain behavior or a 
new user-centric factor becomes significant for a behavior 
then the system will adapt accordingly. The system has all 
required information to do this so called re-evaluation by 
mapping user‘s actual responses to a more meaningful 
risky/non-risky decision. This will allow it to move beyond 
the static point in time to a continuous understanding of these 
factors and correlations.  Therefore, by knowing the actual 
behavior and response, those found significant correlations 
will be truly significant. Further to that, new threats might be 
introduced and impact a behavior quite differently depending 
on user-centric factors. As such, those relations are 
periodically revised such as every six months. Not limited to 
that, user‘s responses will be periodically used to intelligently 
re-measure user-centric factors. For example, user‘s IT-level 
could be changed from a non-IT professional to an IT-
professional based on his behavior. These examples serve to 
demonstrate that UCRAR can dynamically adapt to changes in 
user-centric factors. Hopefully, this process will be used as 
feedback mechanism to keep the system up-to-date and 
gradually move away from behavioral intent to actual 
behavior. 
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TABLE II. SETTINGS OF USER-CENTRIC FACTORS 
5) User-centric risk estimator: This process performs a 
mapping of user behavior to applications. Hence, what is the 
user doing against what application given that a threat against 
an application maybe increased by a user‘s insecure behavior. 
User-centric factors will be considered as a risk factor when 
assessing risk on the user level. As the threat against a certain 
application maybe increased due to user‘s insecure behavior, 
behaviors are assessed, resulting in a risk score/level, 
behavior-score, and used as a risk factor. Additionally, other 
risk factors that are behavior-related are considered such as 
the application importance, app-score, as detected by the 
Software Detector process and the used communication 
channel. Consequently, assessing these user-centric and 
behavior-related risk factors will result in an individualized 
risk score/level, behavior-risk which is the output of this 
process. 
6) Network estimator: Given that a vulnerable router is 
more likely to be exposed and used as a threat source [32], this 
process will monitor the status of the network in which the 
user is connected to and is kept to a minimum level. Hence, 
information about the used network devices, i.e. routers, are 
collected and passed to the System-Based Risk Estimator. 
Router information will be expressed in terms of router‘s 
software name and version and passed to System-Based Risk 
Estimator to check it for vulnerabilities. Thus, the output of 
this process is the parameter r-id which is the ID of the 
software executed on the router in CPE. 
7) System-based risk estimator: As perfect security is 
considered to be unachievable for information systems, then 
the goal is to achieve a security level that is deemed 
appropriate to user‘s needs and requirements. A vulnerable 
software could be exploited by attackers compromising the 
system where this software is running [6] such that the more 
vulnerabilities in a software the less secure it is and, 
eventually, the lower its trustworthiness level. This process 
analyses and calculates security risks on system level.  This is 
accomplished by checking all installed applications, router 
software and also platform information in terms of the used 
Operating System for vulnerabilities. For each of the 
previously mentioned, the System-Based Risk Estimator will 
check vulnerabilities knowledge bases such as NVD and CVE 
for known vulnerabilities and calculate a software risk score 
accordingly. Then, a final system risk score, system-risk, will 
be calculated which is the output of this process. 
8) Risk aggregator: The purpose of this process is to 
evaluate/assess security risks based on information obtained 
from User-Centric Risk Estimator and  System-Based Risk 
Estimator and generate a risk profile that adapts to users 
accordingly. Hence, this risk profile is composed of a set of 
parameters that are required by the Security Response 
Manager to do its job. This Aggregator will assess and analyze 
the security risk and determine the final risk score, overall-
risk. However, the quality of the risk assessment depends on 
the accuracy and granularity of data provided by the 
previously mentioned processes. Thus, the output of this 
process is the generated risk profile as follows: 
Risk-Profile=(B-actual, U-info ,overall-risk ,risk-level, 
date) 
where overall-risk is the quantitatively expressed and 
calculated overall risk score, risk-level is the qualitatively 
expressed overall risk level and date is the date and time 
stamp this behavior was performed. 
The operational flow in this Risk Assessment Component 
is as demonstrated in Fig 2. 
User-centric 
factor 
Description Determined 
Age 
Users will be classified into 
three age groups: 18-30 years, 
31-50 years and 51+ years 
Offline. By explicitly 
answering  a direct 
question, as part of 
system 
setup/configurations 
Gender 
Users will be classified as 
either male or female 
Personality 
According to their BFI score 
users will be classified as 
either high or low in one of 
the personality traits of 
Openness, Conscientiousness, 
Extraversion, Agreeableness 
and Neuroticism. 
Offline. By using a BFI 
tool, as part of system 
setup/configurations 
Learning style 
According to their preferred 
learning style, users will be 
classified according to their 
VARK learning style as either 
Visual, Aural, Read/write or 
Kinesthetic 
Offline. By using a LS 
tool, as part of system 
setup/configurations 
IT level 
According to predefined 
metrics to measure their IT 
expertise such as settings and 
modification of web browser 
configurations, frequent use 
of shortcut keys and the use 
of advanced features in 
software/apps such as section 
breaks and cross sections in 
MS Word and macros in MS 
Excel, the user will be 
assigned an IT proficiency 
level of either professional or 
not 
Online. Determined 
implicitly by the User 
Behavior Monitor  
Service usage 
According to  predefined 
metrics to measure their 
service usage and online 
activity such as number of 
unique IP addresses accessed, 
number of hours spent online 
on a predefined basis and 
volume of transferred data, 
the user will be assigned a 
service usage level of high 
usage, medium usage or low 
usage. 
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Fig. 2. Operational Flow in the Risk Assessment Component of UCRAR 
B. Risk Estimation Models 
As UCRAR provided a mechanism for understanding both 
system and user/behavior based risk and how to respond to 
them, a mechanism for estimating such risks is required. For 
the purposes of this Paper, three risk estimation models are 
proposed. These are a System-based, User-centric and 
Aggregated Risk Estimation Models to be used by the System-
based Risk Estimator, User-centric Risk Estimator and the 
Risk Aggregator processes of UCRAR‘s Risk Assessment 
Component. 
1) System-based risk estimation model: For the system-
based risk estimation, a vulnerability-oriented approach will 
be used to assess and analyze security risks on the system 
level through the use of CVSS scoring algorithm [37]. 
Accordingly, any estimated risk score/level in UCRAR will be 
in accordance with the used CVSS scoring system, i.e. 0..3.9 
low risk, 4..6.9 medium risk and 7..10 high risk. The nature of 
the proposed model allows the use of any software risk 
scoring methodology utilizing a CVSS scoring algorithm. 
Thus, the methodology proposed by [21] will be used to 
calculate the risk score of installed applications, app-risk, the 
used Operating System, os-risk, and router‘s software, nw-
risk. Additionally, the source name of the installed 
application, install-name, is used as a risk factor. Since this 
risk factor is application-specific, it will be added to the 
calculated app-risk. If the application was installed from an 
illegitimate source, then the final security score of the 
application, app-risk, is calculated as follows: 
IF install-name = illegitimate THEN           (1) 
{increase app risk level from low to medium} 
IF 0<= app-risk <= 3.9 THEN app-risk = 4 
{increase app risk level from medium to high} 
ELSE IF 4<= app-risk <=6.9 THEN  app-risk = 7 
Therefore, the final system risk score, system-risk, is 
calculated as follows: 
System-risk  = app_risk *wapp + os_risk *wos  + nw_risk*wnw / 
(wapp+wos+wnw)                  (2) 
where wapp, wos and wnw are subjective weights. 
Unfortunately, there is no evidence yet on how to weight 
app-risk, os-risk and nw-risk or suggest the proportion of 
impact each of them has on the system risk score/level, 
system-risk. Thus, these weights are suggested as 0.5, 0.3 and 
0.2 respectively. However, the proposed model allows for a 
variety of ways such that whenever future research is available 
regarding this proportion, the proposed model could easily 
adopt to it. 
2) User-Centric risk estimation model: Assessing user-
centric and behavior-related risk factors will result in an 
individualized risk score/level, behavior-risk. In order to 
understand what needs to be measured and quantified , a list of 
possible user‘s behaviors is necessary. Nevertheless, it is 
unrealistic to assume all possible user‘s behaviors especially 
with the existence of multiple platforms and the increasing 
number of applications on a yearly basis [2]. Therefore, 
structuring it will provide a more meaningful risk assessment. 
Accordingly, a categorization of user‘s behaviors is suggested 
as in Fig. 3. Namely, these behaviors could usefully be 
categorized as System/Device-related behaviors and 
application-related behaviors that are further categorized 
according to the nature of the behavior and type of data 
accessed. Data is categorized according to the risk and impact 
on user‘s CIA and privacy when this data is modified or 
disclosed. 
a) Application-Related Behaviors 
The impact of consequences (CIA and P) of various user 
behaviors generate different risk levels within an application 
as discussed in section 3. Not limited to  assessing user‘s 
behaviors, but behavior-related risk factors are assessed such 
as the used password, the used communication medium and 
account type if any. Among the several risk methodologies 
discussed in section II is CRAMM [26]. Seven impact 
consequences adopted from CRAMM are identified. Namely, 
impacts of disruption (D), personal privacy (P), data 
corruption (DC), embarrassment (E), financial lost (F), legal 
liability (LL), personal safety (S). As it is hard to assess this 
from one user to another due to different user-centric factors 
and to provide a fine-grained valuation that reduces the burden 
on the user in terms of user input, the potential consequences 
will be assessed and assigned for each behavior category. 
Then, each behavior will be mapped into its corresponding 
category. An example of potential consequences is as in Table 
3 where they are rated as 0-Low, 1-Medium and 2-High. 
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Fig. 3. A Suggested Categorization of User's Behaviors. 
TABLE III. AN EXAMPLE OF SUGGESTED BEHAVIOR CONSEQUENCES 
 Suggested Consequences 
Behavior Category E F P DC LL S D 
Read-private-data 
2 
(H) 
0 
(L) 
2 
(H) 
2 
(H) 
0 (L) 
0 
(L) 
1 
(M) 
Write-private-data 
1 
(M) 
2 
(H) 
2 
(H) 
2 
(H) 
1 
(M) 
0 
(L) 
0 (L) 
Write-public-data 
1 
(M) 
0 
(L) 
1 
(M) 
1 
(M) 
0 (L) 
0 
(L) 
1 
(M) 
To estimates risk, a matrix-based approach will be used 
and a risk matrix is generated for each consequence as in 
Matrix 1.The first step in assessing the behavioral risk score, 
behavior-score, is by mapping the behavior‘s potential 
consequences and the application‘s importance level app-
score as detected by the Software Detector process in Matrix 
1. This will result in seven quantitative scores (one for each 
consequence). Second, based on the ―worst case scenario‖ 
principle [45], the maximum value resulting from the Matrix 1 
is used. Hence, a behavioral risk score, behavior-score, will be 
generated as: 
behavior-score =  MAX(consequences)           (3) 
  
Consequence/ Attribute / 
Connectivity 
  Low Medium High 
a
p
p
-s
co
re
 0 0 1 2 
1 1 2 3 
2 2 3 4 
3 3 4 5 
4 4 5 6 
Matrix 1: UCRAR Risk Matrix 
The same approach is used for estimating behavioral-
related factors such as the used password auth-score and the 
used communication channel connect-score if any. For 
calculating auth-score, password‘s hygiene is checked for 
several attributes such as its length and password reuse. An 
authentication risk matrix is generated for each attribute as in 
Matrix 1. Each password attribute is assessed as 0-Low, 1-
Medium or 2-High. After mapping the application‘s 
importance level app-score and password‘s attributes in 
Matrix 1, the maximum value resulting from the above risk 
matrix is used. Whereas for estimating connect-score, a risk 
level is pre-assigned for each type of communication channel 
such as Low for 3G/4G, Medium for Bluetooth, NFC and 
private WiFi and High for Public WiFi. These risk levels are 
based on the security measures utilized for data transmission 
by the communication channel. The used communication 
channel‘s pre-assigned risk level is mapped with the related 
app-score in Matrix 1 to generate a connect-score. Hence, the 
resulting behavior-score/auth-score/connect-score is a 
quantitative value from 0 to 6. However, based on findings of 
[70], two situations are identified. If the assessed behavior is 
significantly correlated with a user-centric factor, then the 
resulting behavior-score is recalculated first based on the 
significance correlation risk factor as explained in the next 
section. then behavior-risk is calculated as in (4). Otherwise, 
behavior-risk is calculated as in (4). In both cases, the 
resulting behavior-risk will be normalized because all scores 
used in the risks calculations are from 0 to 10. 
Given that the disclosure or modification of private data in 
a private Facebook account, for example, has a lower risk 
level than in a public account, a pre-set score of 1 and 2 is 
assigned for private and public accounts respectively as the 
account-type-score (if any). 
Finally, to estimate behavior-risk, 
behavior-risk=AVG(behavior-score,auth-score,connect-
score)+account-type-score              (4) 
b) System/Device-Related Behaviors 
A risk estimation model is proposed for each 
system/device-related behavior category. Connectivity 
behaviors are assessed in the same approach as in estimating 
connect-score. In responding to alerts or settings behaviors, 
risk is estimated for these behaviors as stand-alone behaviors 
regardless of application importance, app-score. If an alert is 
ignored/no action taken by the user or a setting is disabled, 
then risk is high and an averaging approach is used to 
calculate behavior-score by adding the values at both ends of 
the level‘s scale ( high risk level has a risk score between 7 
and 10) and dividing it by 2 as in (5). For Device locking 
behaviors, risk is not only estimated if such control is utilized 
or not, but also the degree it complies to good authentication 
behavior such as password hygiene. Hence, risk is estimated 
such that If no lock is used, then risk is high and behavior-
score is estimated as in (5). If device lock (PIN) is used, then 
it is assessed for its hygiene using Matrix 1 in an approach 
similar to that of estimating auth-score. 
behavior-score= (7 + 10)/2 = 8.5            (5) 
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The resulting behavior-score is recalculated based on the 
significance correlation risk factor (if any) resulting in 
behavior-risk. 
3) The significance correlation risk factor: The novelty of 
this risk assessment scheme is that a different risk profile is 
created for the same behavior given a number of users. Based 
on our work [70], it was found that the risk score/level of a 
behavior may be positively or negatively affected by certain 
user-centric factor such as personality trait, age and IT 
expertise. Thus, the significance of the correlation between a 
user‘s behavior and user‘s-centric factors (if any) is used as a 
risk factor to reassess the behavioral risk score, behavior-
score. However, when considering the significance correlated 
risk factor, two situations are identified, namely, the 
significance correlation risk factor for application-related 
behaviors and the significance correlation risk factor for 
system/device-related behaviors. In the former, the 
significance of a correlation implies that due to certain user-
centric factors values (Low, Medium, High), the likelihood of 
a security threat is either decreased or increased. Asset value 
is equivalent to the application‘s importance level from the 
user‘s perspective whereas how easy a security breach may 
occur depends on the type of user‘s behavior. Hence, the 
significance correlation matrix, matrix 2, is adopted from [10] 
where user-centric factor value, behavior-score and app-score 
are used instead of threat likelihood, ease of exploitation and 
asset value respectively in the original matrix. 
User-centric 
factor Value 
Low Medium High 
behavior-score L M H L M H L M H 
A
p
p
-s
co
re
 
0 0 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 4 
1 1 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 5 
2 2 3 4 3 4 5 4 5 6 
3 3 4 5 4 5 6 5 6 7 
4 4 5 6 5 6 7 6 7 8 
Matrix 2: Significance Correlation Matrix 
The proposed methodology for the significance correlation 
risk factor for system/device-related behaviors and 
application-related behaviors is as described in Figs. 4 and 5. 
4) Aggregated risk estimation model: The proposed model 
for aggregating the user-centric risk score, behavior-risk, and 
the system-based risk score, system-risk, for application-
related behaviors is as follows: 
Overall-risk = (behavior-risk * wbr) + (system-risk * wsr)  (10) 
 
Fig. 4. Application-Related Behavior's Methodology for Significance 
Correlation Factor. 
 
Fig. 5. System/Device-Related Behavior's Methodology for Significance 
Correlation Factor. 
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Where wbr and wsr are subjective weights and suggested as 
0.5. Unfortunately, there is no evidence yet on how to weight 
behavior-risk and system-risk or suggest the proportion of 
impact each of them have on the final risk score/level, overall-
risk. However, the proposed model allows for a variety of 
ways such that whenever future research is available regarding 
this proportion, the proposed model could easily adopt to it. 
As a vulnerable application is not considered, arguably, as 
a threat source when assessing risks of system/device-related 
behaviors such as in not utilizing a device lock or in 
connecting to a public WiFi network. Moreover, the threat is 
in the behavior itself as a stand-alone behavior regardless of 
compound risks. Thus,  overall-risk for system/device related 
behaviors is the same as the user-centric risk score as 
Overall-risk = behavior-risk          (11) 
C. Risk Communication Component 
The second component of the framework, Risk 
Communication, starts by receiving the individualized risk 
profile form the Risk Aggregator, analyzing it and deciding on 
the most suitable form of communicating/educating the risk to 
the user. Different from the related work described in Section 
II, the proposed model is intended to assess and communicate 
risks in near real time and alert the user before taking further 
action. Evidence suggests that static risk communication may 
result in users becoming inattentive to messages delivered 
[51][71][72]. Hence, the robustness of risk communication 
should be suited to the encountered risk by providing the user 
with real time needed security education about his risk taking 
behavior. This is done in an individualized persuasive manner 
to transform him from being ill-informed to a security minded 
user. To accomplish this risk communication, the following 
processes are established: 
1) The security response manager: Based on the user‘s 
behavior risk level, the Security Response Manager will make 
a decision on what the next step is. However, when 
communicating risk to the user, the response manager will 
decide upon the best form of persuasive technology that best 
suits the user based upon U-info that is part of the risk profile. 
Thus, to educate user‘s about security risks and promote good 
behavior, user-tailored messages that take into account the 
individual user-centric factors are used. Two sub-processes 
carry on the functionality of The Security Response Manager 
as follows: 
 Risk Evaluator: Once the risk profile is received, the 
risk level is checked first. If the behavior is secure, i.e. 
low risk, then behavior-response-information is sent 
immediately to the Historical Risk Register. If the 
behavior is insecure, i.e. risk level is medium or high, 
then the risk profile is forwarded to The Response 
Organizer. 
 Response Organizer: Prior to issuing a message, it 
will check the Historical Risk Register of previous 
incidents of the same behavior and the issued security 
messages related to it. Hence, the response mechanism 
of this process depends on two concepts, namely, 
informing the user of his behavior‘s risk score/ level 
and deciding on the best way to communicate/educate 
the user about his risk-taking behavior. Hence, based 
on the information received in the risk profile and 
historical data about the same behavior (if any) from 
the Historical Risk Register process, a gradual, 
individualized and persuasive response mechanism of 
varying gradual response levels is suggested. 
2) Historical risk register: All user‘s behaviors, whether 
secure or insecure, and information related to it are 
continuously stored in this register/database for a limited time 
period then discarded. This time period will be reasonable 
enough to capture the latest changes in user‘s behavior 
without exhausting resources in storing too much data. 
Whenever a risk profile is received, it is compared with 
relevant historical risk data. The result of this comparison is 
used to determine the type/level of response. This will be 
stored as the following tuple: 
res-behavior = (b-actual, date,  response, module, u- action, 
risk-score, risk level)           (12) 
Where: response is the response level. However, 0 is used 
to indicate no response issued, i.e. secure behavior. Module is 
to indicate the type of recommended security education 
module (if any) of either security awareness,  training or 
none, Module Є {aw, tr, no}. u-action is user‘s behavior 
towards a given module if any, i.e. ignored, postponed or 
obeyed U-action Є {i,p,o} Additionally, this information will 
be used by the Security Response Manager when issuing a 
motivation alert, user‘s behavior report and to identify areas in 
which the user has mostly behaved insecurely and in need of 
further education. 
3) Alerts, reminders/notifications, awareness and 
training: Security is ―rarely the user‘s primary goal‖ and users 
only try to protect themselves from risks salient to them [71]. 
This targeted risk communication goes beyond passively 
notifying/warning users of security risks to act as a tool to 
educating and training the user on good behavior to make 
security informed decisions whilst displaying the security 
message. This is accomplished through additional 
teaching/education in the user‘s preferred learning style such 
as gamification, video or podcast. 
4) Internet-based Body of Knowledge: To educate the user 
about security, a form of targeted security education will be 
provided based on user‘s behavior focusing, mainly, on 
educating him of his risk taking behavior. This will be decided 
upon by searching an Internet based body of knowledge that is 
developed by a third party, or simply the Internet as a huge 
knowledge base for security information such that the required 
security information will be searched for, identified and 
located on the Internet. As the accuracy and effectiveness of 
such provided info should be evaluated, the creation of such 
knowledge base and evaluation of retrieved security 
information are outside the scope of work of this research and 
could be part of future work. Hence, operational flow in this 
component is as demonstrated in Fig. 6. 
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Fig. 6. Operational Flow in the Risk Communication Component of 
UCRAR. 
IV. EVALUATION OF UCRAR 
The resulting risk scores/levels from the Risk Assessment 
component will enable other processes of the proposed 
UCRAR, the Security Response Manager for example, to take 
that information and act accordingly. Given the aim and 
objectives of this paper to develop a user-centric approach 
towards risk assessment, a decision was made by the authors 
to focus on the Risk Assessment component of UCRAR and to 
have further work in the Risk Communication component as 
future work. 
As UCRAR is dependent upon a variety of factors, 
whether user-centric such as IT proficiency and personality 
traits, or behavioral-related such as the used communication 
medium and authentication hygiene, the aim is to evaluate its 
effectiveness, feasibility and nature, i.e. how it works given a 
number of different users with different characteristics and 
behaviors. Furthermore, to empirically investigate whether the 
dynamics of the proposed UCRAR operate in the envisaged 
manner and the factors identified to impact risk do have an 
impact upon the resulting risk scores/levels. However, to 
evaluate the model, there exists a number of challenges in 
implementing the proposed model on real users and within a 
real environment. The need to develop the required controls to 
do the process of user monitoring and the development of  
several knowledge bases such as the community-based risk 
data are examples of such challenges. Although different 
approaches could be taken to evaluate the model, the most 
complete and comprehensive approach that will enable a 
comprehensive analysis of the model appeared to be a 
simulation-based approach. In this approach, a number of 
users with different risk profiles across the spectrum will be 
replicated.  Hence, risk will be estimated/calculated 
independently for each user. 
In order to do a walkthrough of the proposed model and 
understand, in a categorized fashion, how different users are 
impacted by risk, a scenario-based simulation based upon a 
variety of users‘ profiles from one end to the other is designed 
considering the following: 
1) All possible user-centric factors permutations for 
different users. 
2) To understand the nature of how user‘s behaviors 
impact the risk scores/levels, behaviors included in the 
scenario reflects examples of each behavior type from the 
proposed Categorization of Behaviors as in Fig. 3 . 
3) Behaviors selected demonstrate the difference between 
the resulting risk scores/levels of behaviors that were found to 
be most significantly correlated with a certain user-centric 
factor and those that were not (Behavior 6).  
4) Varying app-scores with low, medium, high and very 
high importance are assumed. 
The simulation is done as follows: 
 The scenario is assumed to model the nature of the risk 
process. However, it is worth highlighting that the 
scenario selected is an example and has no specific 
basis only that it introduces a number of different risks 
a typical user might encounter. 
 A variety of users with different user-centric factors are 
assumed. 
 The model is applied and risk is calculated. 
 Results are analyzed to understand how different users 
are impacted by risk 
Hence, assuming the scenario of a user is sitting in 
Starbucks coffee shop and connected to their WiFi. While 
browsing his email‘s inbox, he opened an email from an 
unknown sender asking for his credentials and bank account 
number to claim a won lottery prize, but ignored it. Then, he 
opened another email from a friend and downloaded a 
greeting card that was attached to it. Meanwhile, he was 
alerted that a new update for his AntiVirus application is 
available, but cancelled it. At that time, a friend came to sit 
with him where they chatted for an hour. When his friend left, 
he unlocked his device and started browsing job websites. 
When a job request was found and wanted to apply for it, he 
was asked to register with a username and password first. 
After registration, he was prompted by the browser to 
remember this password and accepted. Subsequent to signing 
in, he was redirected to another website unknown to him to 
download and fill an application form. Ignoring an alert not to 
open this document, he opened the document, filled it up and 
clicked on ―SEND‖. As he was typing the BBC News 
website‘s URL, he was alerted that a preinstalled application 
(AntiVirus application) is slowing down his device so he 
immediately disabled it and continued browsing. Starbucks‘s 
Router is using CISCO AIRONET access point software 
version 8.1 (112.3). The user is using a Samsung Galaxy Note 
3 running Android version 4.4.4, Google Chrome application 
version 39.0.2171.45 and Email application version 
4.2.2.0200. The user is using Symantec Mobile Security as an 
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AntiVirus application. All installed applications were 
downloaded from GooglePlay.  Both the email‘s password and 
the job website‘s password comply to all password hygiene 
attributes except that the former does not contain uppercase 
letters and the same password is used for his Twitter account 
while the latter is 5 characters long. The used device pin lock 
is 1111. The user rated the importance of  Twitter application 
as low (app-score = 1), Chrome as medium (app-score = 2), 
Email as High (app-score = 3) and Symantec Mobile Security 
as very high (app-score = 4). However, all applications were 
installed from Google Play which is a legitimate market. 
The types of users assumed along with their user-centric 
factors are as in Table 4. Given the above scenario, a list of 
insecure security behaviors, i.e risks, along with their behavior 
type and the user-centric factor that was found to have the 
most significant correlation with that behavior according to 
findings of [70] are as in Table 5. 
To assess risk of the behaviors mentioned in Table 5, risk 
is estimated on the system level first then on the user level. 
To estimate risks on the system level, system risk : 
Using the methodology proposed by [21],  the security 
scores of each of the mentioned applications , app-risk, the 
used Operating System, os-risk, and router‘s software, nw-
risk, are calculated. Then, System-risk is estimated for the 
applications of Chrome, Email and Mobile security as 5.8, 5.8 
and 5.5 respectively. 
To estimate risks on the user level, behavior- risk and 
overall-risk: 
For each behavior in Table 5, risk of the behavior, 
behavior-risk, is estimated first followed by estimation of 
aggregated/final risk, overall-risk resulting in scores as in 
Table 6. This is done according to user‘s rating of used 
applications, Twitter‘s app-score = 1, Chrome‘s app-score = 
2, Email‘s app-score = 3 and Symantec Mobile Security‘s 
app-score = 4. For space limitations detailed calculations are 
not included. These are available upon request. 
TABLE IV. USER‖R-CENTRIC FACTORS --- * USER WITH HIGHEST RISK PROFILE, ** USER WITH LOWEST RISK PROFILE 
User 
Personality Traits 
Age Gender IT Proficiency Service Usage 
Extra. Agree. Con. Neuro. Open. 
A High Low Low High Low 40 Years Male IT Pro. Low 
B High High High Low Low 55 Years Female Non IT Pro. Medium 
C Low Low High Low High 27 Years Male IT Pro. High 
D* High Low Low High Low 19 Years Female Non IT Pro. High 
E** Low High High Low High 52 Years Male IT Pro. Low 
TABLE V. A LIST OF USER‘S INSECURE BEHAVIORS 
B# Behavior Behavior Type 
Most Significant 
Characteristic  
Correlation 
B1 Connecting to a public WiFi 
System-Device/ 
Connectivity 
Service Usage Positive 
B2 Same password for multiple Accounts Application/Authentication IT proficiency Negative 
B3 Did not delete a suspicious email 
Application/  
Write - Private data 
Age Negative 
B4 
Opened an attachment in an email from a 
friend without checking 
Application/  
Read -Private data 
IT proficiency Negative 
B5 AntiVirus software not updated System-Device / Settings IT proficiency Negative 
B6 Cancelled a security related update 
System-Device /  
Responding to alerts 
None None 
B7 Did not disable WiFi when not using it System-Device / Connectivity Gender Negative 
B8 Device Lock of ―1111‖ 
System-Device / 
 Device locking 
Con. Personality trait Negative 
B9 
Allowed browser to remember his 
password 
Application/  
Write - Private data 
Service usage Positive 
B10 
Opened a document despite security 
warning 
System-Device / Responding to alerts Age Negative 
B11 Disabled AntiVirus software Application/ Settings Con. Personality trait Negative 
B12 
Downloaded a file from an unknown 
website 
Application/  
Write - Public data 
Con. Personality trait Negative 
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TABLE VI. THE RESULTING USERS‘ RISK PROFILES 
  Users   Users 
B# Calculated risk A B C D* E** B# Calculated risk A B C D* E** 
B1 
●behavior-risk 7.5 8.5 9.5 9.5 7.5 
B7 
●behavior-risk 7.5 9.5 7.5 9.5 7.5 
overall-risk 7.5 8.5 9.5 9.5 7.5 overall-risk 7.5 9.5 7.5 9.5 7.5 
B2 
▲behavior-risk 6.3 8.8 6.3 8.8 6.3 
B8 
●behavior-risk 8 6 6 8 6 
overall-risk 5.9 7.2 5.9 7.2 5.9 overall-risk 8 6 6 8 6 
B3 
▲behavior-risk 6.3 6 6.7 6.7 6 
B9 
▲behavior-risk 5 5.3 5.7 5.7 5 
overall-risk 6.1 5.9 6.3 6.3 5.9 overall-risk 5.4 5.6 5.8 5.8 5.4 
B4 
▲behavior-risk 6 6.7 6 6.7 6 
B10 
●behavior-risk 8.5 7.5 9.5 9.5 7.5 
overall-risk 5.9 6.3 5.9 6.3 5.9 overall-risk 8.5 7.5 9.5 9.5 7.5 
B5 
●behavior-risk 7.5 9.5 7.5 9.5 7.5 
B11 
▲behavior-risk 10 7.5 7.5 10 7.5 
overall-risk 7.5 9.5 7.5 9.5 7.5 overall-risk 7.8 6.5 6.5 7.8 6.5 
B6 
●behavior-risk 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 
B12 
▲behavior-risk 5.3 4.7 4.7 5.3 4.7 
overall-risk 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 overall-risk 5.6 5.3 5.3 5.6 5.3 
*user with highest risk profile , **user with lowest risk profile, ▲application-related behavior, ● system/device-related behavior 
 
Fig. 7. Overall-Risk based on Personality, IT Proficiency. 
 
Fig. 8. Overall-Risk based on Gender, Service-usage Level and Age. 
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A comparison of these results based upon  the impact of  
user-centric factors on the resulting risk scores/levels,  
highlights a number of trends. As IT proficiency and 
conscientiousness personality trait  user-centric factors were 
found to be most significantly negatively correlated with 
behaviors B2, B4 and B5 for the former and behaviors B8, 
B10 and B12 for the latter, this impact is explicit.  IT 
professionals and those with a high level of conscientiousness 
personality trait were in lower risk than non-IT professionals 
and users  with lower levels of conscientiousness as in Fig. 7 a 
and b. A similar impact was apparent for males over females 
as gender user-centric factor is most significantly negatively 
correlated with  behavior B7 as in Fig. 8 a. The user-centric 
factors of age and service usage levels are categorized in three 
levels of low, medium and high with an opposing significant 
correlation with behaviors B1 and B9 for the former and B3 
and B10 for the latter. As illustrated in Fig. 8 b and c, the 
variations in these user-centric factors resulted in varying risk 
profiles for users as the higher the service usage level of the 
user the higher the risk and conversely, the older the user the 
lower his risk level. These results are in line with findings of 
[70]. 
Opposing to the above mentioned behaviors resulting risk 
scores/levels, behavior B6 that was found not to be 
significantly correlated with any of the studied user-centric 
factors resulted in  a unified risk score/level, i.e. 8.5 High risk,  
for all users as in Fig. 9. The comparison between resulting 
risk scores/levels of other behaviors and those of behavior B6 
serve to show how the proposed risk models take into account 
the variations in the most significant correlated user-centric 
factors when calculating risk. Moreover, it shows the 
difference between an individualized and a none-
individualized resulting risk scores/levels. To this end, 
different risk profiles were obtained for the same behavior as a 
result of variations in users-centric factors. This suggests that 
the proposed model can adapt to these variations resulting in a 
more realistic and individualized risk score/level. 
This simulation is based on a time line scenario of 
activities. To reflect the evolving nature of risk over time, 
Fig.10 illustrates how the risk score changes for each user as 
the time goes through the scenario based upon the behaviors 
being exhibited. As system-risk is almost constant of 5.8, the 
resulting deviation of risk scores from 5 to 10 is based upon a 
single scenario. However, in other scenarios with other 
systems, different varying system risks will be included which 
will result in varying risk scores across the spectrum, i.e from 
0 to 10. 
 
Fig. 9. Overall-Risk based on None Significant Correlation. 
 
Fig. 10. Resulting Users‘ Risk Profiles Over Time. 
To this end, the analysis of the simulation results provided 
an indication that risk could be assessed differently for the 
same behavior based upon a number of user-centric and 
behavioral-related factors resulting in an individualized 
granular risk score/level. This granular risk assessment, away 
from high, medium and low, provided a more insightful 
evaluation of both risk and response. The analysis of results 
was also useful in demonstrating how risk is not the same for 
all users and how the proposed model is effective in adapting 
to differences between users offering a novel approach to 
assessing information security risks. 
V. DISCUSSION 
A user-centric risk assessment and response framework 
that takes into account, when estimating risk, variations in 
user‘s characteristics is proposed. In addition, other 
behavioral-related factors were considered in estimating risk 
resulting in a risk score/level not of a single behavior but of 
compound risk. Using a scenario-based simulation of a variety 
of users with different risk profiles, the proposed risk 
estimation models were applied and results analyzed. 
Actually, this was an opportunity to show that risk has to be 
based on the user and there are factors whether user-centric or 
behavioral-related that influences his behavior and risk 
score/level accordingly. This is evident as different risk 
profiles were obtained for the same behavior as a result of 
variations in users‘-centric factors such as his age,  personality 
trait and service level usage showing that the proposed model 
can adapt to change in these factors to produce an 
individualized risk score/level. However, when comparing the 
resulting risk scores/levels of a certain behavior for different 
users, as in B4 for instance, we are able to see no difference in 
the risk level, i.e. medium. From the user‘s perspective, this 
increase or decrease in the risk score but within the same risk 
level may not be relevant. Consequently, the nature of the 
proposed models do not allow for a decrease or an increase of 
3, for instance, in one hit. Thus, this level of granularity is 
picked up and understood by the security response manager 
that this 0.5 increase or decrease, for example,  does mean 
something and acts accordingly. This is similar in concept to 
the concept of ―Fever‖ in the human body. As the normal 
temperature is 37.5c, an increase of temperature of 0.30c to 
37.8 implies that the person has high fever and a medical 
procedure has to be applied. Similarly, the temperature of 
39c is still considered high fever but the difference is in how 
it is treated. 
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To this end, user-centric factors do contribute to the 
resulting risk scores/levels either by escalating or deescalating 
it. There is clear evidence to suggest that, in comparison to 
prior work, the proposed risk assessment methodology is a 
novel approach that incorporates user-centric and behavioral-
related factors when calculating risk. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A user-centric framework that assesses and calculates risk 
on both user and system level was proposed. This framework 
is composed of two components, risk assessment and risk 
communication. Three risk estimation models were proposed 
to calculate both behavior-risk and overall-risk. These models 
used a number of risk factors when estimating risk. The risk 
assessment component of the proposed framework was 
evaluated using a scenario-based simulation of different users 
and results analyzed. The proposed risk calculation models 
worked in the way they were expected to. The analysis of 
results revealed a number of trends and relations. Further to 
that, the analysis provided evidence that the level of impact 
and contribution of risk factors is not fixed for all users and 
behaviors. There are other sources of risk to the user other 
than his actual behavior. These sources range from user-
centric to behavioral-related. Aside from the traditional ―one 
size fits all‖ solution in prior literature, encouragingly, the 
results of this simulation provided an indication that risk could 
be assessed differently for the same behavior based on a 
number of user-centric and behavioral-related factors resulting 
in an individualized and timely risk score/level. Future work 
will focus on evaluating the risk communication component of 
UCRAR first, then have a running/implemented version of 
UCRAR to conduct a series of experiments with real users to 
evaluate its effectiveness as a whole. 
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